Abstract: Existing commitment schemes were addressed under the classic two-party scenario. However, popularity of the secure multi-party computation in today's lush network communication is motivating us to adopt more sophisticate commitment schemes. In this paper, we study for the first time multireceiver commitment in unconditionally secure setting, i.e., one committer promises a group of verifiers a common secret value (in computational setting it is trivial). We extend the Rivest model for this purpose and present a provably secure generic construction using multireceiver authentication codes (without secrecy) as building blocks. Two concrete schemes are proposed as its immediate implementations, which are almost as efficient as an optimal MRA-code. We believe using other primitives to construct variants of this concept will open doors for more interesting research. Key words: commitment scheme; multi-party computation; unconditional security; authentication code; verifiable secret sharing CLC number: TP 391 
Introduction
Commitment schemes were first introduced by Blum [1] . To the best of our knowledge, commitment scheme in the unconditionally secure setting was first studied by Rivest [2] (using noiseless channels only). Then
Blundo et al [3] gave the first mathematical formalization of an unconditionally secure commitment scheme, followed by Pinto et al [4] presenting a relation between this concept and unconditionally secure authentication schemes (A-codes). That is, an unconditionally secure commitment scheme can be built from such an A-code and an unconditionally secure cipher system, and in the opposite, a resolvable design (/optimal) commitment scheme is a composition of an A-code and a cipher system. However, all the previous commitment schemes, which are either computationally secure [5] , or unconditionally secure, or with one player possessing infinite computational power [6] , were studied in the traditional two-party scenarios. The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility of multi-party (esp. multireceiver) commitment schemes where a committer wants to commit himself to a value to a group of receivers. We will only focus on the unconditionally secure settings for the following reason: In computationally secure settings, commitment schemes base their security on the difficulty of efficiently solving some computational problems, and are most often non-interactive. Thus any two-party commitment scheme is automatically a multireceiver commitment scheme.
In the unconditionally secure settings, however, it is well known (and easy to see) that in a two-player scenario with only noiseless communication, OT (Oblivious Transfer) and BC (Bit Commitment) with information-theoretic security is not possible, even if only passive cheating is assumed, and players are allowed infinite computing power [7] . This is the reason why Rivest introduced the so-called trusted initializer model where the dependence on the trusted party is minimized. We will also talk about MRC (multireceiver commitment) schemes under a similar extended model, assuming multicast channel exits.
More specifically, there are three different roles in the model: a trusted initializer Ted, a committer Alice and a group of receivers Bobs [2] [3] [4] ). Ted is only involved in the initialization phase, distributing secrets to Alice and R, and then keeps inactive. When Alice wants to commit to a secret value x(of her choice) to all the receivers, she sends some commitment information, say y, to R, by multicasting rather than repeatedly sending to each receiver. To disclose the secret x, Alice sends (multicasts) some extra decommitment information z. Using y, z and his own secret key, every receiver i R R ∈ should be able to make decision independently on accepting or rejecting the disclosure made by Alice and to recover x on acceptance. Formal definition and properties of MRC will be given in the next section.
A trivial MRC scheme that provides the strongest security could be as simple as n copies of single receiver commitment schemes. That is, no participant can collude to cheat the others successfully. However its inefficiency would not be acceptable and there seems no direct way to gain more efficiency for even weaker security, for instance, against n ω ∧ colluders. In our generic construction of MRC, we will provide an option for the number ω of colluders. And we propose two concrete instances of the generic scheme, whose efficiency (in both computation and communication) is much better than the aforementioned trivial approach. This is true for even n ω ∧ (out of the 1 n + participants including Alice and n Bobs).
In brief, our contribution can be summarized as the following. We present for the first time the concept of multi-party commitment in the unconditionally secure setting, which is useful for the emerging popular multi-party computations. We address in particular the MRC schemes in more details. The analogous concepts of multi-sender commitment and even multi-initializer commitment can be defined in a similar manner.
We construct a generic MRC scheme which achieves information-theoretic security against any certain number of colluders, and two concrete MRC schemes which are more efficient and flexible than running the traditional two-party commitment scheme separately with each receiver. More specifically, the computation of a commitment for n receivers is only one additive operation over a finite Galois field F, and the computation of an individual verification is as efficient as the one in optimal MRA-codes (i.e., one evaluation of a degree ω polynomial over F), and the sizes of secret keys for Alice and Bob's are only ( ) O ω field elements with the hidden constant being 1 and 2, respectively.
We note that one can consider constructing generic MRC scheme using VSS (verifiable secret sharing) as building blocks instead of using MRA-codes (multireceiver authentication codes). This, naturally, will propose a question of the fundamental relation among MRC, MRA and VSS primitives.
We also note that using only an A-code with secrecy one can construct an unconditionally secure two-party commitment scheme, leading to an affirmative answer to the open question of Pinto et al [4] . However, due to page limitation, we do not have the opportunity to present it.
MRC Model and Definitions
For the reason aforementioned, all issues addressed in this section is under the information-theoretical settings and for editing convenience, we will use uppercase letters for both domains/sets and the random variables over respective domains/sets, and the corresponding lowercase letters for their elements.
As in the basic commitment model of Rivest [2] , there are three roles in our multireceiver commitment model, namely the trusted-initializer role, the sender role and the receiver role. Although we focus only on multireceiver case, every role could be played by multiple players. To facilitate reading, we call the single trusted-initializer Ted and the single sender Alice, but denote the group of players playing the receiver role by
Assume Ted is connected to Alice and R with secure (both confidential and authentic) channels, while Alice and R are connected by insecure channels, i.e., an adversary is able to eavesdrop, delay, modify and insert messages over the channels. We assume broadcast/multicast is allowed from Alice to the receivers R. Here we call a value to be broadcast/multicast if it is simultaneously sent over all communication channels [8] . We do not care whether the message simultaneously arrives at the re-ceivers. Also, we assume all the communication channels in use are noiseless. In our (non-interactive) model, connections among R are not necessary, but these connections may exist such that part of the dishonest players is able to collude. What property the colluding connections satisfy is beyond our scope.
Remark 1 In the definition of broadcast, Agarwal et al observed that since the (broadcast) value can then be correctly determined using majority voting on the other end, such values are always perfectly reliably transmitted. Since corruptions that occur during broadcasts are easy to detect, in the sequel we (Agarwal, Cramer and de Haan) assume without loss of generality that broadcasts occur without any corruptions on the channels [7] . However, using majority voting needs the players on the other end interactively communicate, which is not desirable in our model. Thus corruptions that occur during broadcasts are possible. Nevertheless the corruptions as such can be modeled by dishonest Alice, which is the case we considered in this paper.
The formal model (information flows) of MRC schemes is illustrated in Fig.1 below.
Fig. 1 The trusted initializer MRC model
The trusted initializer Ted pre-distributes the secret keys to each participant in advance of Alice yet deciding the value to commit to and keeps off-line after the initialization phase. Now a (non-interactive) multireceiver commitment scheme can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A (non-interactive) multireceiver commitment scheme MRC= ( , , , , ) X Y Z K V is composed of four algorithms (Gen,Com,Dcm,Ver) described below, where X denotes the set of values to be committed, Y the set of commitments, Z the set of decommitment, K the set of keys for Alice and 1 n V V V = × × is the direct production of the sets of verification keys for receivers 1 2
Ted uses Gen, a probabilistic algorithm, to generate the pair ( , ) k v K V ∈ × of which k is securely sent to Alice and v to R; The algorithm Com: K X Y × → is used when Alice wants to commit to a value x X ∈ using her secret k. Its output y is sent to R as a commitment to the value x; The algorithm Dcm: K X Z × → is invoked to produce the decommitment information z when Alice wants to reveal the value x and the algorithm Ver = 1 Ver Ver n ×⋅ ⋅ ⋅× where each Ver i :
× is used by the receiver i R to verify the correctness of decommitment z with respect to the commitment y and to recover the value x.
Correctness: When all players are honest, every receiver will accept and recover the committed value correctly. That is, for all ( , ) k v generated by Gen and for all
. In this paper, we assume full trust on Ted but no trust at all on Alice and R. That is, Ted always securely distributes correct secrets k and v to Alice and R, respectively and would neither mount attacks to other players nor collude with any player. However, Alice may collude with some receivers to cheat other receivers (fooling them to accept the commitment as to a value different from x) and a subset of receivers may collude to cheat Alice (recovering the value x before receiving z) or even the remaining receivers. For simplicity of presentation, let N be the set of indices{ . When such i does not exist, i.e., / N C =∅ , we artificially set as zero the not well-defined probability. This way we can uniformly have 0 w n ≤ ≤ .
(1 ) β − -origin: The colluders of up toω receivers
should not be able to impersonate Alice making commitment acceptable by any receiver with a probability bigger than β . That is, the probability / , max max α β ω -secure if up to ω colluders are allowed. We say a commitment scheme provides perfect hiding or is concealing as per the terminology for single receiver setting [3] if it is ( , ) α β -secure.
Note that a single receiver concealing commitment scheme providing (1 ) α − -binding property is an ( , ,0:1) α ⊥ -secure scheme using our terminology, since β does not exist at all and 1 ω = only makes sense for binding property. Therefore simplified as above, merely α -security or ( , ) α γ -security is enough for defining the security for single receiver commitment schemes. This shows that the multireceiver setting is much more complicated than the single receiver setting.
Preliminaries
We recall in this section some useful primitives. S M E V = is composed of three algorithms (EGen, Tg, Vf ) . Where S denotes the set of source states; M denotes the set of authentication messages which is also written as S T × for a cartesian MRA-code, i.e., MRA-code without secrecy; ε denotes the set of keys for the sender (alias Alice) and
notes the direct production of the sets of keys for the receivers R.
The three algorithms are used in the three phases of an MRA scheme. We briefly explain them as follows. In the initialization phase, a trusted initializer (alias, Ted) runs EGen to generate the encoding rule e E ∈ for Alice and the verification rules v V ∈ for all the receivers.
In 
is not able to learn any information about the verification key of any other receivers [9] , or equivalently if the chance of success for any group of up to ω receivers in an impersonation (as well as a substitution) attack is the same as an outsider [10] . We denote these chances as I P (and S P ) respectively. Remark 3 There are two differences comparing to the definitions for some MRAs [10, 11] . For details see the full version of the paper.
MRC Constructions

A Generic Construction
Given an encryption system ENC = ( , , , X Y S Enc, Dec) and a multireceiver authentication scheme MRA= ( , , ( , : ) P P ω -secure, where I S , P P denote the maximal probability of an adversary succeeding in the impersonation and the substitution attacks respectively in the MRA-code.
The proofs for this theorem as well as the following theorem are omitted due to space limitation.
Complexity of the protocol: The computation complexity of the whole protocol equals to that of the encryption system and the MRA-code. However the communication complexity is only that of the MRA-code, since we do no need to distribute the encryption key which is part of the MRA-code (i.e., the source code). So for this construction, we can immediately have the bounds on the size of each domain as well as on α and β . Committing more than one time: By using the MRA-code with higher level, say l, of security, Alice (the committer) can make more than one (i.e., l) commitments without the necessity of changing verification secrets on the receivers' side. This is done by TI distributing more messages ( , ),1 [4] in the composition of cipher system and authentication code (i.e., from A-code to ( , ) n ω MRA-code), while MRC2 can be viewed as an extension of that by Rivest [2] in the viewpoint of verifiable secret key sharing (i.e., from ( )
w F -sharing). We choose the cryptosystem to be the one-time pad over a finite Galois field F (the addition, minus and product are denoted as + , − and i ). That is X Y S F = = = .
Then Enc( , ) s x s x = + and obviously Dec( , ) s y y s = − .
MRC1:
We choose the MRA to be the polynomial based construction due to DFY [10] . The sender's encoding rule is two random polynomials ( ( ), ( )) e f X g X = of degreeω . Then for each receiver i R , his verification rule
∈ is generated by evaluating the polynomials at i (which could be public). To authenticate a source s F ∈ , the sender calculates ( )
and sends ( , ( )) m s t X = to the receivers. Then The secret keys of the sender Alice and every receiver consist of ( 1) ω + If one chooses to trivially run n copies of the Rivest protocol, there will be 2n field elements in the secret key of Alice. This is true even for anyω . It is obvious inefficient compared to both of our schemes, especially for small ω cases. Furthermore, the length of messages communicated is almost 3 times of our schemes. Actually, a straightforward but non-trivial extension of the Rivest protocol can be constructed as follows (MRC0), resulting in an MRC scheme equivalent to at least ω copies of the Rivest protocol. Its sender secret key is twice of MRC1 or MRC2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied for the first multireceiver commitment in unconditionally secure setting. That is, a committer can make commitments to a group of verifiers. Different from the fact that in the computational setting, constructing multireceiver commitment (MRC) is trivial should the (noninteractive) two party commitment scheme exists, commitments (either two party or multiparties) in information theoretic setting can only exist with a trusted infrastructure. We extended the two-party model of Rivest to multireceiver case and presented a generic construction using multireceiver authentication codes (without secrecy) (MRA-codes) and two efficient implementations.
It is worth noting that generic MRC schemes can be also constructed by using VSS (verifiable secret sharing) etc as building blocks instead of using MRA-codes. In fact, one of the two concrete implementations under the first generic construction can also be viewed as an implementation under the latter seemingly completely different framework.
In the traditional two-party commitment, we pointed out the possibility of affirmatively answering the open question of Pinto, Souto, Matos and Antunes by presenting a generic construction based on only an A-code with secrecy.
However, there is still a lot of work to do. We believe that our work will initiate a couple of new interesting researches and hopefully, more applications of multireceiver commitment schemes will be found in the near future. Particularly, they are interesting problems to study the fundamental relation among the related primitives, such as MRC, MRA-code (with or without secrecy) and VSS, to investigate bounds on the keys of committer as well as receivers, and to explore perhaps other extensions (e.g., efficient commitments for dynamic sender).
